ARE POLITICIANS A PROTECTED CLASS?: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 'REASONABLE ACCESS' MEDIA
RIGHTS UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Matthew W. Daus*

To most Americans, politicians do not qualify as
a protected class. However, due to the constituencies they represent, the candidates' rights may
have an impact on voters' rights. In our media
saturated society, the ability of a candidate for
public office to obtain television or radio access is
often crucial to a campaign's success. Furthermore, a candidate's ability to deliver a message to
American voters through the broadcast media
plays a critical role in the preservation of a free
and democratic society.
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act'
guarantees candidates for federal elected office
the right of "reasonable access" to the broadcast
media. While the federal election law reform was
well intentioned, Congressional exclusion of state
and local candidates to "reasonable access" remains a mystery. Although twenty-five years have
passed since the passage of Section 312 (a) (7), it is
not untimely to pose a constitutional inquirynamely, does the distinction drawn between federal and non-federal candidates under the "reasonable access" rule violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution? 2 This query is the
subject of this article.
Now is the time to reconsider the Constitutional ramifications drawn between federal and
non-federal political broadcasting. Campaign finance reform is currently underway and sister
provisions of the Communications Act are pro-

posed for amendment. In the United States Senate, for instance, campaign finance reform legislation was introduced in January 1997 by, inter alia,
Senators McCain and Feingold. This legislation
was placed on the Senate calendar in September
1997. 3 A portion of the proposed legislation seeks
to amend Section 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934, 4 which would grant candidates to the
United States Senate thirty minutes of free broadcasting time. 5 Although this proposed amendment does not address the "reasonable access"
provisions of Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, the underlying issue of media access
is addressed with respect only to United States
Senate candidates. Therefore, as related changes
may take place during an upcoming Congressional term, it is timely to raise the Constitutional
issues presented herein.
Section I of this article describes the "reasonable access" requirement for federal candidates
under Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications
Act, as interpreted by the courts and the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"). Section
II examines the case law progression applicable to
voter and candidate rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, and identifies the
appropriate standard of constitutional review.
Section III analyzes the constitutionality of the
"reasonable access" rule's exclusive applicability
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47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
Although there is no explicit Equal Protection Clause

in the United States Constitution which applies directly to
the actions of the Federal government, the Due Process

standards that apply to state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166, n.16 (1987).
3 See S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997).
4 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
5
See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997).
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to federal candidates in light of proffered governmental objectives and legislative intent.

sure of political programming, which the public
interest obligation of broadcasters already provided for."'

1. A FEDERAL CANDIDATE'S RIGHT OF
REASONABLE ACCESS TO THE
BROADCAST MEDIA
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act
provides that a broadcasting station's license may
be revoked for "willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy. "6
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC.,7 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether Section
312(a) (7) created an affirmative individual right
of media access or merely codified the pre-existing general public interest standard applicable
to all political broadcasts. 8 In 1979, the CarterMondale Presidential Committee requested television access on specific dates and programming
times. 9 The Committee wanted to broadcast a formal announcement of President Carter's candidacy, which included a documentary describing
his administration's record.1 ' Petitioner CBS refused to make all the requested times available
due to the large number of Presidential candidates and the potential programming disruption
that might ensue."
The Supreme Court held that Section
312(a) (7) gives rise to a "personal right of access"
by "focus[ing] on the individual 'legally qualified
candidate' seeking air time to advocate 'his candidacy,' and guarantees him 'reasonable access' en12
forceable by specific governmental sanction."'
The Court further declared that "[i]t is clear on
the face of the statute that Congress did not prescribe merely a general duty to afford some mea6
7

8

47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
See id. at 376-377.

9 See id. at 372-373.
1o Id.
It See id. at 372.
Id. at 377-379.
12
13 Id. at 377-378.
14
Id. at 379, n.6; citing Public Notice: The Law of Political
Broadcastingand Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C. 2d 2209, 2290 (1978)
"1978 Primer."
15

Id. at 378.

16

100 F.C.C. 2d at 1525-26 (1984).

3

Furthermore, the Court touched upon the distinction between federal, state and local candidates for office. In a footnote, the Court elaborated on its holding and stated, "[t]he public
interest requirement still governs the obligations
of broadcasters with respect to political races at
the state and local levels."'14 This language put
state and local candidates subject to the pre-19 7 1
public interest standard requiring stations to
make "reasonable good faith judgments about the
5
importance of particular races."'
In its 1984 Primer, the FCC described briefly
the obligations created by Section 312(a) (7) with
respect to state and local candidates:
[T]he law does not require stations to provide access to
every state, county, and local candidate. However, the
Commission, the courts, and Congress have recognized
that political broadcasting is one of the most important
services that a station can provide to the public. Therefore, stations are expected to allocate reasonable
amounts of time to other political races, based on the
the races and
licensee's judgment of the importance of
16
the amount of public interest in them.

Such language appears to apply the general public interest standard to a state or local candidate's
request for media access.' 7 Furthermore, the
analysis of the 1984 Primer appears to be a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in CBS.
The FCC revised its rules pertaining to political
broadcasting in 1992.18 After the public comment period, the Commission addressed the issue
of media access by state and local candidates. 19
Bound considerably by the unequivocal language
in Section 312(a) (7), which specifically applies
reasonable access rights to federal candidates, the
Commission decided as follows:
The Commission will not reqtire a specific right of access for non-federal candidates. Section 312(a) (7), the
only access provision in the political broadcasting laws,
Political broadcasting is one of the fourteen elements
17
that must be covered in order for a broadcast licensee to
meet the "public interest" requirements in addressing the
"needs and desires of the community." See Report and Order:
Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C. 2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1978).
See generally 47 C.F.R. Parts 73 and 76, 57 Fed. Reg. 189
18
(Jan. 3, 1992).
19 Radio Broadcast and Television Broadcast Services,
Cable Television Service; Codification of the Commission's
Political Programming Policies, 57 Fed. Reg. 189, 192 (1992)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73 and 76).
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is quite explicit in creating a right of "reasonable access" exclusively for federal candidates. Thus, no statutory basis exists
to create a right which Congress implic2z
itly rejected.

Although it is clear that both Congress and the
FCC mandate that individual access rights under
Section 312(a) (7) apply only to federal candidates, the rationale for this limitation is not apparent from the face of the statute and regulations
alone.
The legislative history surrounding the enact-

ment of Section 312(a) (7) does not provide a
clear justification for limiting media access rights
to federal candidates. Section 312(a) (7) was enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.21 The initial House drafting did not
contain what later became Section 312(a)(7).22
Section 312(a) (7) was added to the Senate version of the bill and initially applied to "any legally
qualified candidate" - whether federal, state or
local. 23 However, the applicability of Section
312(a) (7) was narrowed by the Joint Conference
Committee, which expressly limited its provisions
24
to federal candidates.
II.

THE APPLICABLE LEVEL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY

312(a) (7) violates the Equal Protection Clause is
to determine the applicable level of judicial scrutiny. If a law discriminates unequally against a suspect or protected class or involves a fundamental
25
right, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
However, if a law draws a distinction between persons who do not belong to a protected class and
does not involve a fundamental right, the law will
pass constitutional muster if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

'26

The distinction drawn in Section 312(a) (7) is
between federal, and state or local candidates for
public office. In Chandlerv. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission,27 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that candidates for public office are not members of a protected class and
that only a rational basis analysis is necessary for
Equal Protection purposes. 28 However, when the
rights of candidates are restricted, the rights of
voters are indirectly affected. Because voting is a
fundamental right 2 9 which ordinarily triggers
close judicial scrutiny, questions arise concerning
the nexus between the rights of candidates and
30
voters.
In Bullock v. Carter,31 the Supreme Court held
that a Texas primary election filing-fee system
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment Equal

The first step in analyzing whether Section
20

See id.

See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
22
See H.R. REP. Nos. 92-564 & 92-565 (1971), reprintedin
117 CONG. REc. 43417-22 (1971).
23
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, at 22 (1971).
24
Id.; see also H. CONF. REP. No. 92-752, at 22 [hereinafter H. CONF. REP. No. 92-752] (1971).
25
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
26
Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir.
1990). See also Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181
(N.D. Cal. 1988). "Unless a statute distinguishes on the basis
of a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification, or burdens fundamental rights, then it will be presumed valid and sustained
against an equal protection challenge if 'the classification
drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" See
id. at 179. Property owner claimed that a land use measure
precluding him from obtaining a change in her property's
zoning designation without prior approval involved neither a
suspect class, nor a fundamental right, and consequently, the
Court applied a rational basis standard. See id. at 181.
27
Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications
Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
28
See id. at 489. Although Chandler involved Section
315 of the Communications Act, its Equal Protection analysis
is the same as that applied to Section 312(a)(7). Chandler
involved attempts by the Libertarian Party's candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor to enjoin televised political debates between the Democratic and Republican candi21

dates for those offices, unless they were also included as participants. See id.at 488. The court held that the decision of a
public television station to limit the number of participants
in a televised political debate was rationally related to the
programmer's undertaking to provide an educational program of sufficient interest to attract interested viewers, and
that such a decision is for the programmers to decide. See id.
The court declined to set a precedent that would require
public television stations to forego the. broadcast of important public issues by all "serious" candidates in order to provide a public forum to any candidate that obtained a ballot
position. See id.
29
The United States Supreme Court considers the political franchise of voting to be a fundamental political right
because it is "preservative of all rights." See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (holding that a municipal ordinance
regulating public laundries within the limits of a municipality, in this case San Francisco, violates the principles of the
Constitution, if it confers upon the municipal authorities arbitrary powers to make unjust discriminations founded on
classifications based on race). The guarantee of protection
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States extends to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to differences of race, color, or nationality. See id. at 356.
30
See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
31 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding that a
state statute that imposes fees of such magnitude that numerous qualified candidates are precluded from running in an
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Protection Clause. 32 The Texas statute at issue required candidates for public office to pay a filing
fee in order to be placed on the ballot for primary
elections. 3 3 The Court determined the "threshold question" to be whether the appropriate standard ofjudicial review of the Texas statute was "rational' basis. . .or a more rigid standard of
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Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise, and
because this impact is related to the resources of the
voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude,
as in Harper, that the laws must be "closely scrutinized"
and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment
objectives in order to pass constituof legitimate state
39
tional muster.

review."
The Court in Bullock recognized that because
fundamental right status had not been afforded to
"candidacy" in general, that "a rigorous standard
of review" would not be invoked. 35 The Bullock
Court cited to Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,36 in which the Court invoked a strict standard of review to find an annual poll tax on residents over the age of twenty-one to be a denial of
Equal Protection. The Bullock Court, however,
found the facts were distinguishable, yet applied
the reasoning of Harperto formulate its own standard of review.
Essential to an understanding of both Harper
and Bullock is the distinction between candidates
and voters. Harperwas based on the constitutional
rights of voters, not candidates. Bullock, however,
pointed out that the rights of candidates and voters are not easily separated from either a theoretical or a correlative standpoint.3 7 Hence, the Bullock Court declared that "[i]n approaching
candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in
a realistic light the extent and nature of their im38
pact on voters."
Candidates were not afforded fundamental
right status by the Bullock decision. However, the
Court intimated that, if an infringement on candidates' rights has more than an incidental or minimal impact on the rights of voters, then strict scrutiny may apply. The Bullock Court clarified the
standard of scrutiny as follows:

The effect of the Texas filing-fee on voters was
"neither incidental nor remote," as the electorate's choice in less affluent communities would
be more heavily affected due to their candidates'
inability to pay. 40 Instead of merely demonstrating a "rational basis" for the filing-fee system, the
Bullock court required a showing of "reasonable
necessity." 4 1 In both Harperand Bullock, the relationship between wealth and voting rights was a
vital factor in not only the outcome of the case,
but in justifying the applicable standard of review.
For example, the Court elaborated in Harperthat
"wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
to one's ability to participate in the electoral process." 42 The Harper Court then proceeded to
"closely scrutinize" the poll tax law, declaring it
unconstitutional because "wealth or fee paying
has. . .no relation to voting qualifications [and]
the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental
43
to be so burdened or conditioned."
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Bullock standard in Paulsen v.
FCC44 . A petition was filed to review an FCC ruling by entertainer Pat Paulsen, who declared his
candidacy for the Republican nomination for
President in 1972.45 Since Walt Disney planned
to air a television series starring Pat Paulsen during the campaign, a declaratory ruling was sought
from the FCC as to whether television stations
that broadcast the series must provide "equal opportunities" to other candidates for television

election must be closely scrutinized and can be sustained
only if it is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate
state objective, and not merely because it has some rational
basis).
32 See id. at 134. Appellees seeking candidacy for local
office in the Texas Democratic Primary Election challenged
the validity of the statutory scheme which required payment
of fees as high as $ 8,900. See id. Appellees asserted they
were unable to pay the required fees and were therefore
barred from running. See id. The Court held that, although
a state has an interest in regulating the number of candidates
on a ballot and eliminating those that are spurious, it cannot
attain these objectives by arbitrary means such as those called
for by the Texas statute which eliminates potential candidates who cannot afford filing fees. See id.

Id. at 142.
See id. at 142-143.
36
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
37 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S 134 at 143.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 144.
40
See id. at 143-144.
41
See id. at 144.
See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
42
43
Id. at 670. Justice Harlan joined in a dissent with Justice Stewart, disagreeing primarily with the majority's application of strict scrutiny. See id. at 681. Instead, the dissenters
favored the application of a rational basis test. See id.
44 Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974).
45 See id. at 888-889.

34

33

See id. at 135.

34
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time pursuant to Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934.46 The FCC found that "any national television appearances by Paulsen would
impose equal opportunities obligations upon
broadcast licensees."

4' 7

On appeal, Paulsen argued that the FCC ruling
was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection because he was compelled to abandon his
employment and livelihood in order to run for
public office while other candidates were not similarly burdened. 4

Paulsen relied on Bullock, con-

tending that the FCC ruling "falls with unequal
weight - on performers not wealthy enough to
stop working during their campaigns.."49

The

Paulsen court held that:
In Bullock the Court applied neither a compelling state
interest test nor a rational basis test. Rather it required

that, upon 'close scrutiny,' the Texas filing-fee system

sions of the Communications Act were unconstitutional. The District Court in Morrisseau, relying
on Paulsen, rejected plaintiffs equal protection
claim for the same reasons that the FCC ruling
was upheld in Paulsen54 and chose not to elaborate on the issue. Therefore, as a result of the
holding in Morrisseau, for constitutional purposes,
the same standard of Equal Protection review in
Bullock appears to apply to both Section 312(a) (7)
(the "reasonable access" rule) and Section 315
(the "equal opportunities" rule) of the Communications Act.
III.

A.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 312(a) (7)
The Legislative Intent of Section 312(a) (7)

be 'reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of le-

gitimate state objectives.' Texas maintained that the
fees were necessary to regulate the primary ballot and
to finance elections. The Court found, though, that
the fees served no rational regulatory purpose and that
the state interest in saving election costs did notjustify a
system that excluded poorer candidates unable to pay
the fees. We find that Section 315 as interpreted by the
FCC, on the other hand, is both reasonable and necessary to achieve the important and legitimate objectives
of encouraging political discussion and preventing unfair and unequal use of the broadcast media.
50 The section therefore passes constitutional muster.

The legislative history of Section 312(a) (7) provides no clear explanation for its exclusive application of reasonable access rights to candidates
for federal elective office. However, a few justifications can be proffered to explain the basis for
drawing the federal/non-federal distinction.

The Ninth Circuit in Paulsen interpreted the
Bullock test to involve a middle level scrutiny,
somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational
basis review. In 1974, the Paulsen decision was applied by the District Court for the District of Vermont in Morrisseau v. Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc. 5 1 In Morrisseau,pro se plaintiff Dennis Morrisseau contended that defendant WCAX-TV was required to provide him free time as a candidate for
office because, unlike his opponents, he was unable to pay for advertising on the station. 52 Morrisseau's action was based on the equal time provisions of the Communications Act, namely
5
Sections 312(a)(7) and 315. 3
Morrisseau argued that the equal time provi-

The most compelling justification for limiting
the "reasonable access" requirement to federal
candidates may be to prevent the saturation of
broadcast programming during the election sea-

46 See id. at 889. Section 315(a) provides in pertinent
part: "[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all

other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
47
Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889.
48
See id. at 891-892.
49
Id. at 892.
50
Id. (citation omitted).

1. Saturation of the Broadcast Media

son. 55 There are certainly less federal candidates

than the number of state and local candidates
who could conceivably inundate the broadcast
56
media with their "reasonable access" requests.
In fact, the likelihood that state or local candidates may successfully access the broadcast media
under the general public interest standard may be
seriously diminished by the exercise of federal
candidates' "reasonable access" rights. Federal
candidates who exercise Section 312(a) (7) rights
might absorb most of the broadcasting time dur51
Morriseau v. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 512 (D. Vt. 1974).
52
See id. at 514.
53 See id. at 513.
54
See id. at 516.
55
Cf Chris T. Kako, Note, The Right of "ReasonableAccess"
for FederalPoliticalCandidatesUnder Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1287, 1303 (1978) [hereinafter Kako].
56
See id.
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ing an election season which may, depending on
the state, coincide with state and local elections.

2.

The ConstitutionalAuthority for Congress'
Enactment of the FederalElection Campaign Act

Congress' decision to limit the "reasonable access" rule to federal candidates was part of an
election reform package which included the enactment of Section 312(a) (7) as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The goal of
this legislation was to reform federal election law.
Amending the access and political advertising
provisions of the Communications Act was not the
sole purpose for the enactment of the Federal
Election Campaign Act. Rather, the goal of promoting fairness in federal elections (not state or
local elections), appears to be the dominant
theme.
Due to the nature of campaign reform legislation, Congress' constitutional authority to act appears to be based primarily upon its right to regulate federal elections 5 7 rather than its power to
regulate interstate commerce. 58 Congress may
have exercised caution and deference by not interfering -with the sovereign rights of states and
their municipalities in enacting laws regulating
state and local elections. 59 However, Congressional authority to enact laws regulating the
broadcast industry is derived from the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. 60 Federal broadcasting laws preempt any and all state broadcasting

57
See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 4 (stating that "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing [sic] Senators.").
58
See Kako, supra note 55, at 1302-1303, n.89.
59
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. X. It is self-evident that States have the sovereign right, in accordance with their Police Power, to regulate
the time, manner and place of elections for State and Local
office. However, such State rights must give way where a superseding Federal constitutional right or federal law
preempts such rights under the Supremacy Clause.
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regulations as a consequence of the Constitution's
61
Supremacy Clause.
3.

The Effectiveness of the Media in Federal
Campaigns

Because national and statewide campaigns are
enormous undertakings, the role of the media is
crucial to their success." 2 However, the broadcast
media may not be the most effective method for a
local candidate to deliver his or her campaign
message.6 3 Due to the grass roots nature of local
campaigns, many local candidates may find it
more effective to utilize other methods of communication, such as the distribution of campaign
literature or use of the print media, rather than
the more costly broadcast media.
Congress may have considered federal candidates to be more reliant upon the broadcast media for campaign communication than state and
local candidates due to the enhanced size and volume of Congressional Districts as compared to
most state and local election districts. Accordingly, Congress may have found federal campaigns to be in greater need of "reasonable access" to the broadcast media in order to effectively
communicate campaign messages to voters, than
state or local candidates. Despite this proposed
rationale for a federal/non-federal distinction, no
reference exists in the legislative history of Sec64
tion 312(a) (7) to justify this theory.

60) See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the
Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States ...").
h1
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6,

See

KATHLEEN

HALL JAMFISON,

PACKAGING THE PRESI-

487 (3d ed. 1996). See also DARNELL M. WEST, AIR
WARS 1 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEST].
6" See WEST, at 1 (explaining that in 1996, Steve Forbes
and Bob Dole both spent over $30 million in advertising).
64 See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773 (vol.
2), 1787, 1792, 1828, 1867.
DENCN
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B.

The Augmented Equal Protection Standard
of Bullock v. Carter

1.

The Nexus Between Local Candidate and Voter

Under Bullock, when examining the constitutionality of candidate restrictions, it is essential to
analyze "the extent and nature of their impact on
voters."6 5 By its limitation to federal candidates,

the "reasonable access" requirement of Section
312(a) (7) may impact upon voter decision-making by denying them information concerning
state and local candidates via the broadcast media
during election season.
In Presidential, Senatorial and House of Representative elections, advertisement via television
and radio is the primary method of communicating a candidate's message to voters. 66 Often, vast
amounts of campaign funds are expended on
political advertising in elections where voters
67
must be reached over wide geographical areas.
One may contend that the federal/non-federal
distinction is justified in that the offices of President, Senate and U.S. Representative are more
significant and influential than some state and all
local offices due to the enhanced size of the voting pool which elects these federal officials. However, some statewide offices such as governor,
state comptroller, state attorney general and
mayor of a large city represent more voters than
all or many Congressional districts. For instance,
there may be a more compelling need for statewide gubernatorial candidates to deliver a
message to voters, because decisions made by this
office impact the everyday lives of the citizens of
the entire state, perhaps more so than a local fed68
eral elected official.
However, the delivery of most government services occurs through state and local governSee Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
See generally Russel J. Davis, Political Candidate'sRight to
Equal Broadcast Time Under 47 U.S.C. § 315, 35 A.L.R. 856
65
66

(1977).

See id. at 887.
68 One could also contend that the federal/non-federal
distinction is justified because federal law is supreme, and
that federal issues are of greater importance for political
broadcasting purposes.
69 See generally Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM
International, 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997).
70
See id. at 345.
67

71
72

Id.

See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g. Co., 287 So. 2d

78, 87 (1974).

ments. 69 The everyday problems of voters are addressed primarily through state and local
legislatures. Many local government agencies,
such as the Departments of Health, Sanitation,
Transportation, Fire, Police, Social Services and
Zoning Boards, deal directly with essential governmental functions.7 0 State and local legislators are
entrusted with and held accountable by their constituents for the delivery of quality government
services through such entities. 7 1 Issues which
such officials address can spark intense local pub72
lic interest in terms of political broadcasting.
The broadcast media could have a powerful impact upon the dissemination of information that
can'influence the result of an election. 7 3 Hence,
increased broadcast media access for federal candidates empowers voters by providing them with
information that can both influence their voting
decisions, and prompt them to make a trip to the
74
voting booth when they otherwise might not.
Because state and local candidates are important
to the electorate, the rights of voters are affected
when greater broadcast media exposure is provided to federal candidates, but not to local candidates.
The media has such an important influence
upon voters, 75 and therefore, a clear and sufficient link exists between the rights of citizens to
vote and a candidate's right to media access. Accordingly, the Bullock standard of "reasonable necessity" should be applied to an Equal Protection
analysis of Section 312(a)(7). Given the obvious
governmental objective of promoting equality in
federal elections, 76 Congressional exclusion of
state and local candidates from the "reasonable
access" provisions appears unnecessary. Even if
one were to contend that only federal election reform was the intent of this law, Congress' exclu-

73

See generally Schacter, infra note 75 and accompanying

text.
See id.
SeeJane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "PopularIntent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 131
(1995) [hereinafter Schacter] (stating that the "most comprehensive studies of voter behavior in ballot campaigns
demonstrate that media communications and political advertising are the most important sources shaping how voters understand the initiative proposals on which they are asked to
vote.") See alsoJack Winsbro, Misrepresentationin PoliticalAdvertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 859860 (1987).
76
See H. CONF. RP. No. 92-752, supra note 24, at 22.
74
75
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sive legislative authority conferred by the Commerce Clause 77 to regulate all broadcasting in the
United States imposes an obligation and responsibility to ensure the rights of all candidates and
voters are protected equally. By leveling the playing field among federal candidates, Congress has
effectively locked out state and local candidates
from the field itself. Conceivably, state and local
candidates could be unable to receive "reasonable
access" even under the general public interest
standard, because the federal candidate may utilize most of a licensee's broadcasting time.
It is important to clarify the distinction between
the holding in Paulsenand the result proposed by
this article. In Paulsen, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of Section 315(a) of the
Communications Act - which affords all candidates (federal, state and local) with "equal opportunities" to use a licensee's broadcasting station if
access is granted to another candidate for the
same public office. 78 The overall purpose of both
the "equal opportunities" and "reasonable access"
provisions, which were enacted simultaneously as
part of the Federal Election Campaign Act, was to
"encourag[e] political discussion and prevent. . .unfair and unequal use of the broadcast
media."79 Although such purposes were furthered by the Section 315(a) requirement that all
candidates be afforded "equal opportunities,"' ' 0
Section 312(a)(7)'s exclusion of state and local
candidates belies entirely the very basic and legitimate governmental objective of encouraging
political discussion and preventing unequal use of
the broadcast media.
Any broadcast media congestion,- caused by the
"reasonable access" requests of federal candidates,
may deny equal use of the broadcast spectrum to
state and local candidates. Section 312(a)(7), as
written, could be inherently unfair in its application. Political discussion concerning issues
presented to voters by state and local candidates
through the broadcast media can be either precluded or discouraged - again due to federal

candidates' consumption of broadcast time under
Section 312(a) (7), which may afford state and local candidates minimal public interest broadcasting time on state and local issues that are often of
greater interest and import to voters.
2.

The Relationship Between Wealth and
"ReasonableAccess"

In Bullock, the Supreme Court emphasized that
a candidate's inability to pay filing fees Would
have an impact upon the rights of voters in less
affluent communities. 8s

The Bullock Court struck

down the Texas filing fee law on Equal Protection
grounds for that reason.8 2 In Harper,a poll tax
law was declared unconstitutional because it made
the fundamental right to vote contingent upon

83
wealth or the ability to pay a fee.

Both the Harper and Bullock decisions involve
election laws which, on their face, link a candidate's wealth or ability to pay to a burden upon
the fundamental right to vote.8 4 Filing fees and
poll taxes are blatant wealth-based restrictions. 85
Although the plain language of Section 312(a) (7)
does not raise any recognizable wealth based distinctions, the "reasonable access" provision raises
such concerns in its application.8 6
Certainly, many incumbent federal candidates
possess sufficient resources and funds to finance
their re-election campaigns. To be competitive,
candidates who seek to challenge an incumbent
federal candidate must be well financed in order
to carry on a meaningful campaign. Incumbent
federal candidates often have the luxury of Political Action Committee "PAC" and special interest
group funds at their fingertips. Unlike most federal officials, many local and state incumbent may
not be able to raise the same level of funding with the exception of statewide office. The inequity of applying the "reasonable access" law to
only federal candidates is evident. The "reasonable access" requirement does level the playing
field between federal candidates, yet by doing so,

§ 8.
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See Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889.

See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
79
See Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889; see also S. REP. No. 96, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971); S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1971) (stating that Title I of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 will "give candidates for public office
greater access to the media so that they may better explain
their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters.").
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See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-144.
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See U.S. CONST. art. I,

See id. at 149.
See Harper,383 U.S. at 670.
84
See generally Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Bullock, 405
U.S. 134 (1972).
85 See generally, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
86
47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
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state and local candidates are disadvantaged because they may be more likely to encounter difficulty in accessing the media. Federal candidates,
who can otherwise afford alternative means of
campaign communication can over-saturate a station's broadcast time to the exclusion of state and
local candidates. Because federal candidates may
possess greater fundraising potential than many
state or local candidates, federal reasonable access
rights may further elevate the wealth-based distinction between federal and state or local candidates. Indirectly, this disparity in campaign funding can adversely impact the voting franchise.
C.

Rational Basis Analysis

Even if the heightened judicial scrutiny of Bullock were not applied to the constitutional analysis
of Section 312(a)(7), the distinction drawn between federal and non-federal candidates may not
87
survive an ordinary "rational basis" review.
Under any conceivable rationale for the federally
favored "reasonable access" rights created by Congress, the statute fails on Equal Protection
grounds.""
Likewise, if Congress limited "reasonable access" rights to federal candidates because it feared
saturation of the media with requests from numerous state and local candidates, the distinction
must fail.8 9 Given the legitimate governmental interest in encouraging political discussion and
preventing unfair and unequal use of the broadcast media,9 0 the overwhelming importance of
statewide office and local elected office must have
been ignored or disregarded.
Overall, there are more state and local elected
positions than federal elective offices. Yet, the
question remains: why were only federal candidates granted reasonable access rights? Was it because Congress drafted legislation to favor its own
87
Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir.
1990). See also Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181
(N.D. Cal. 1988). "Unless a statute distinguishes on the basis
of a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification, or burdens fundamental rights, then it will be presumed valid and sustained
against an equal protection challenge if 'the classification
drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" See
id. at 179. Property owner claimed that a land use measure
precluding him from obtaining a change in her property's
zoning designation without prior approval involved neither a

suspect class, nor a fundamental right, and consequently, the
Court applied a rational basis standard. See id. at 181.
88

See generally Bullock, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (rejecting

Texas filing-fee system that served no rational regulatory pur-

interests? Was it because federal legislation is
viewed as more important and newsworthy than
state and local legislation? Certainly, the argument that Section 312(a)(7) was part of federal
campaign election reform and not state or local
reform must also fail as Congress should not disregard its Commerce Clause obligations under
the Constitution. 9' By virtue of the Commerce
Clause, Congress is responsible for legislation affecting the entire broadcast spectrum. 92 Without
question, even if Congress' legislative purpose was
to enact a comprehensive package of federal election reform, should it have included the broadcasting implications of the "reasonable access"
rule. If this was an intended oversight, then there
certainly is no rational basis for the federal/nonfederal distinction.
It does not appear rational to draw a federal/
non-federal distinction, as this may raise an inference that federal matters are more important
than state or local matters. This decision should
be left to the voters. The "reasonable access" doctrine, if equally applied to all candidates, may impose an undue burden on the broadcasting industry. However, if a more careful limitation were
drafted, this burden may not exist. For instance,
the "reasonable access" rule could have been limited to campaigns in which the media is a particularly important influence on the outcome of an
election, such as the offices of President, United
States Senate, Governor, State Comptroller, State
Attorney General or any other statewide election.
A limitation in this manner would have been rational. However, including Congressional elections and not statewide positions appears arbitrary. The Congressional objective should have
been to level the playing field for all candidates
where the media plays an important role in the
outcome of an election; not just to foster equality
among federal candidates.

93

pose and excluded poorer candidates unable to pay the fee.)
89 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (recognizing that state has
legitimate interest in avoiding overcrowded ballots).
90 See Paulsen v. F.C.C., 491 F.2d 887, at 889 (1974).
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See U.S. CONST. art I, §8 ("Congress shall have the
Power.
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regulate Commerce.
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.among the several

States...").
92 See id.
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See PAUL TAYLOR, SEE How THEY RUN, 268-280 (1990).

Taylor supports a "five-minute fix" wherein political parties,
not candidates, would receive free broadcast time similar to
the "party political broadcasts" employed in the British system. Id. at 271-272. Regarding the unfeasibility of providing
media access for all candidates. See id. at 276-277. Taylor
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While Congress should not make the determination that federal policy is more important than
state policy, it would be permissible, in determining the overall fairness of broadcast media use, for
Congress to decide whether the broadcast media
is a more important influence on the exercise of
voters' rights in certain types of elections. 94 An
analysis of this type could be based upon factors
including the number of registered voters, the geographical terrain of the district, the functions
and duties of the elected office, in addition to
whether broadcast saturation would cause an undue burden upon the broadcast media.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Congressional rationale for limiting "reasonable access" broadcast media rights to federal
candidates remains a mystery. As demonstrated
herein, any conceivable justification for excluding
state and local candidates from the ambit of Sec-15
tion 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act'
would not pass constitutional muster under either
Equal Protection standard: (1) the heightened
scrutiny test under Bullock and its progeny; or (2)
the rational basis test. 96
Due to the inequities presented by Section
312(a) (7), Congress should consider amending
the "reasonable access" rule to include state and
local candidates.9 7 However, it may not be feasible for any and all candidates to be covered by
Section 312(a)(7). 9 1 Accordingly, Congress

should investigate whether a burden would be imposed upon the broadcast media by extending the
application of "reasonable access" rights to all federal and non-federal candidates. If the findings
reveal that a significant burden would result, Section 312(a) (7) should be repealed. Certainly, the
more logical result would be to amend Section
312(a) (7) and limit the scope of "reasonable access" rights to nationwide and certain statewide
would not guarantee access to every candidate (or any candidate) but instead would allocate broadcast time to political
parties and allow them to decide upon a distributive methodology. See id. at 277-278.
94
See Kako, supra note 55, at 1300-1302 (discussing the
special problems of noncommercial stations and rejecting
Section 312(a)(7) access because the candidate's advocacy
constitutes "commercial").
95 See id. at 1302-1303, n.92 (discussing how the differentiation between Federal and state and local candidates within
Section 312(a) (7) causes the state and local candidates to be
seriously disadvantaged when competing against candidates
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elections. Again, such matters should be determined by Congress after significant inquiry.
The McCain-Feingold Bill seeks to reform the
financing of federal elections. 99 Title I of the proposed legislation pertains to spending limits and
benefits in Senate elections. 10° The scope of the
bill, in its present form, provides for free broadcast time only for senatorial candidates. 01' If this
legislation is aimed only at specific problems
which exclusively or primarily involve campaigns
for the Senate, there may be a rational basis for
limiting the creation of new rights under the
Communications Act. However, Congress must
be mindful to consider Constitutional issues, including the Equal Protection Clause, if it chooses
ultimately to pass this legislation and limit free
broadcasting time to Senate candidates.
The provisions of the McCain-Feingold Bill do
not directly involve Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act in that it seeks to amend only
Section 315 of the Act by creating free broadcasting rights for Senate candidates. However, assuming the free broadcast provisions of this proposed
legislation survive lobbying efforts, further debate
and/or committee revision, Congress may wish to
consider expanding the scope of this legislation to
address the Section 312(a) (7) "reasonable access"
issue presented herein.
The McCain-Feingold Bill will not receive further consideration during this session of Congress. A Republican effort leg by Senator Trent
Lott of Mississippi, resulted in the removal of the
bill from the Senate floor pursuant to a procedural tactic. 10 2 The broadcasting provisions of

the Bill were certainly overshadowed by issues
such as "soft money" political party donations and
interest group advocacy commercials. 103

It is

likely, however, that this Bill and/or its underlying issues, will resurface during the next Congress
as its supporters have vowed to address the acts of
the opposition during this election year.
for federal office for access to a particular station).
96 But see id. at 1304-1306 (discussing the constitutionality of Section 312(a) (7) under free speech rights).
97
See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)( 7 ) (1934).
911

See id.
See generally S. 25, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
loo See il.
101 See id. § 102.
102
See David Rogers, Issues on Campaign Finance Reform
May Cause Sponsors to Change Tactics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
99

1998, at A20.
103
See id.
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Politicians may be a protected class, in that they
represent or purport to represent the people and
voters of their constituencies. It is more democratic to provide both equal and reasonable access
to all qualified candidates so that their viewpoints
and positions may be heard and digested by the
voters. The opportunity now presents itself to re-

visit the legislative decisions made over two decades ago with respect to "reasonable access"
rights. Whether or not the scope of this pending
legislation is expanded, Congress should proceed
carefully and prudently from a Constitutional
standpoint when addressing the broadcasting
10 4
amendments of the McCain-Feingold Bill.

104 The McCain-Feingold Bill has provided for such contingencies in its "severability" provision, which allow for the
survival of the remaining provisions of the Act should any
portion thereof be declared unconstitutional. See S. 25,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1997). In addition, this bill al-

lows for an appeal directly to the United States Supreme
Court from any final judgment, decree or order issued by any
court ruling on the constitutionality of any of its provisions.
See id. § 502.

